In this paper, we present three generalized quantum key distribution protocols between two groups, which consist of k and l members respectively. In these protocols two groups retrieve the secure key string, only if all members should cooperate with one another in each group. We show that if there is an eavesdropper between two groups then their cheating or eavesdropping cannot be accomplished.
Introduction
The computational power of quantum computers has threatened classical cryptosystems. For example, public key cryptosystems, such as RSA, can be broken by quantum computers since the quantum computer can perform fast factorization. On the other hand, the quantum mechanical phenomena provide us a new kind of key distribution, called quantum key distribution (QKD), from which we can in principle obtain perfectly random and secure key strings.
The first quantum cryptographic protocol was presented by Bennet and Brassard [3] and their protocol born the acronym BB84. In 1991, Ekert [12] proposed a QKD protocol using entangled particles. It was modified by Bennet, Brassard, and Mermin [4] . Let us call the modified version the EinsteinPodolsky-Rosen (EPR) protocol. The EPR protocol is a QKD between two persons using an EPR pair of spin . By Hillery et al. [15] , a new QKD protocol between one and two persons was devised applying the correlation of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. After Alice, Bob, and Charlie measure their particles respectively, they discern whether their results produce a correlation or an anti-correlation. If Bob and Charlie work together, they can find Alice's bit. A QKD protocol between one to two persons in which discarded bits are fewer is introduced by Zeng et al. [24, 25] having the use of the center and the GHZ state.
Recently, a QKD protocol between 1 and N − 1 persons using the cat state was introduced by Scarani and Gisin [22] . In their protocol, Alice encodes her key into N − 1 qubits, and all the other partners must cooperate with one another in order to retrieve the key.
Until now, the QKD protocols have been between two persons or 1 and N persons. In this paper, we investigate the properties of several cat states [8] in Section 2 and present three QKD protocols employing the properties.
To begin with, it is known that the cat states give the correlation or anticorrelation as in the case of the EPR pair by investigating the properties of cat states. Applying this relation, in this paper we present the following three protocols. Firstly, we suggest the QKD between two groups as a natural generalization of the EPR protocol that is between two persons. By modifying the several steps of this protocol we can protect the shared bits from being discarded. So it is obtained the second protocol which uses efficiently the cat states. Finally it is constructed QKD between two groups which requires the center's assistance or approval in order to distribute the key. In this protocol the center's role is important because it authenticate two groups to each other. Also, when two groups which don't know each other want to communicate, the center make any two groups communicate. The center's assistance or approval, however, has no effect on security of the protocol.
In these protocols, all members should cooperate with one another in order to obtain the secret key string. Although there is an eavesdropper, Eve, who cooperates with several dishonest members, this eavesdropping does not have an important effect on security of these protocols. This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we discuss properties of the cat states. The first QKD protocol between two groups and its modification are presented in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the QKD protocol with the center's assistance.
Nonorthogonal cat states
Let us start by reviewing cat states [8] . The cat states are n-particle states of the type
whereby u i stands for the binary variable in {0, 1}, and u c i = 1−u i . Furthermore, Equation (1) becomes one of the Bell states when n = 2 and one of the GHZ states when n = 3.
In this paper, the following cat states are used:
And, we define |x± = Φ ± 1
and |y± = Λ ± 1 .
In our QKD protocols, two groups communicate using several particles of the cat states in Equation (2) . So, we need the decomposition of the cat states as in the following.
For n, k and l ∈ N with n = k + l, we have
For n, k, l and m ∈ N with n = m + k + l, it is noticed that the cat states have the similar decompositions from the above equations. For example,
The above identities give the relations between k particles and l particles, or among k particles, l particles and m particles in the cat states. Now, let S={|Φ
− n } and G be a group consisting of n persons. Given an n-particle cat state of S, each member of G takes one particle of the cat state and measures one's own particle in x-or y-direction. Let us define M We use the induction on n for the proof of these facts. For n = 1, it is trivial. Assume that these statements is true for the case of n − 1. Let N G y be even. We first consider the case of the cat state |Φ First, we assume that any one member takes measurement in x-direction and obtains an eigenvalue +1. Let a group G ′ consist of all members except this one member. So
If the one member obtains an eigenvalue −1, M (4) and
On the other hand, when the member takes a measurement in y-direction, proof is the same as the above case because of the equation
That is, the previous relation is hold for n. The same proof is applied to the other cases too.
QKD between two groups
Applying the properties of the cat states proved in the preceding section, we will proceed with the QKD protocols between two groups. Suppose two groups, A and B, prepare a cat state |Φ + n . Each member has one particle of |Φ + n and takes randomly a measurement in x-or y-direction. Then we get the results in Table 1 . When both N For other cat states, we also get similar results as in Table 1 . And then two groups share a bit.
In Section 3.1, it will be discussed how A and B proceed in a fashion similar to the method proposed in the EPR protocol. In Section 3.2, we will discuss a modified protocol that uses efficiently cat states.
Protocol
We suppose that A consists of k arbitrarily ordered members and B consists of l arbitrarily ordered members, and we set n = k + l. The QKD protocol between A and B is as follows:
1. Group A randomly chooses an n-particle cat state out of |Φ ± n and |Λ ± n which is denoted by |S .
2. Each particle of the n-particle cat state |S is transmitted to each member of the two groups.
3. Each member of the two groups randomly performs a measurement on one's own particles either in x-or y-direction, respectively. If each member has the eigenvalue +1 as a measured outcome, then he produces 0, which is called in the outcome. Otherwise, he produces the outcome 1.
4. Each member in the two groups announces on the public channel the basis he used, but not the result he obtained. The two groups, A and B, obtain N A y and N B y , respectively. The member who announces the basis last in each group is called 'the last member'. The last member in group A has to announces the basis before group B.
5. Two groups, A and B, collect the outcomes to obtain P A and P B , respectively, and then obtain the shared bit M
When A gets P A , owing to the increase of probability of conspiracy with a eavesdropper, the probability of eavesdropping on P A increases if more one member of the group obtain P A . So, the only chosen member (let us call him 'the collector') has to get P A . Here, the last member never plays a role in the collector. These facts will be discussed in Section 3.3.2.
The two groups have shared one bit. In order to obtain bit strings, the two groups should repeat the above steps a sufficient number of times. As this is being done, the collector in each group also has to be changed in rotation for each shared bit, because of a might being conspiracy with a eavesdropper. It allows the probability of eavesdropping on the shared test bits to be decreased.
6. The two groups have a public discussion on a set of bits used for an eavesdropper's presence. For the test bits, group A reveals P A and is followed by group B. The reason for this will be discussed in Section 3.3.2.
7. Group A announces the cat states |S which were chosen in Step 1. In case
y is even, then the shared bit is kept, otherwise, the shared bit is discarded. In case |S = |Λ
y is odd, the shared bit is kept, otherwise, the shared bit is discarded.
For a set of test bits, the two groups can independently make a test for the presence of eavesdroppers or conspirators. The remainder bits are the raw keys of each group.
If the test introduce errors, it means that there are eavesdropping or dishonest members, so all shared keys have to be discarded, and they must go back to Step 1. Otherwise, they can go on the next step.
After process of information reconciliation and privacy amplification, group A and group B obtain the (final) key.
We suggest a method of obtaining P A and P B in
Step 5. Let all members be ordered and the first member be the collector. This order has to be arbitrary and rotated. The collector chooses a random bit, which we will express as 'R', adds it to his outcome modulo 2, and gives the result to the second members. The second member adds his outcome to the received modulo 2, and gives it Figure 1 : Obtaining P in Protocol 1: E i is the outcome of i-th member, R is the random bit chosen by the first member and the number of all members is m.
to the third member. This procedure is continued until the collector receives P ⊕ R. Then the collector obtains P, which is (P ⊕ R) ⊕ R (see Figure 1 ).
Modified protocol with a chairman
In the previous protocol, the shared bits are discarded with a probability
Step 7. The cat states can be efficiently used by modifying the procedure of the performing measurement. That is to say, after all members except the chosen member announces information on the basis in Step 3, the chosen member takes the basis dependent on |S such that bit is not discarded. We call this chosen member 'the chairman'. This chairman should be in group A, because he requires information on |S .
Modifying
Step 3 and 4 of the previous protocol as the following, we can obtain a more efficient protocol.
3
′ . Each member in the two groups, except the chairman, randomly perform a measurement on one's own particles either in x-or y-direction, respectively. Each member produces the outcome like the previous protocol. 
Security of protocols
Now, we will analyze the security of the above protocols for two cases. The first case concern a situation in which several members are dishonest. The second case is about an eavesdropper and conspirators in both groups, who use the intercept/resend strategy [2] .
Dishonest members
In this section we consider a situation in which several members are dishonest and try to find the secret key by themselves. Before anything, we should discuss what the dishonest chairman in the modified protocol is able to do. The chairman's basis is determined by N A y , N B y and |S . So all members are able to know the chairman's basis. From this reason, the dishonest chairman's trick is the same that the dishonest collector is able to use. We have no need of the analysis on the dishonest chairman's trick and then discuss only the collector's. It will be discussed later.
The dishonest members has a chance of deceiving other members in only Step 4 (or 4 ′ ) and
Step 5 except that there is one more chance of deception to a collector in Step 6. We will consider a situation in which dishonest members give false information in Step 4 (or 4 ′ ) or Step 5. By giving false information, P's and N y 's have the values different from those without the dishonest members. If errors are made from changed P's and N y 's, all shared bits will be discarded. Hence, they have to prevent certainly all shared bits from having errors, because it is not known what the set of test bits is before they give information on the their basis and outcome. If all shared bits have no error, the dishonest members have no effect on protocols, they conclusively fail to find the secret key string by themselves.
We will think about what a dishonest collector is able to do. The dishonest collector can give false information on the outcome in Step 5. It is equal to revealing the false information on P in Step 6. However, if the collector give false information in Step 6, the test will show errors and all shared key strings will be discarded. Therefore the collector cannot give false information in Step 6 and conclusively fail to find the secret key string by themselves.
Eavesdropper and conspirators in two groups
We analysis that there exist a eavesdropper, Eve, and conspirators in two groups. First it is discussed the case that without help of a conspirator Eve uses the intercept/resend strategy [2] . Second it is concerned that with the help of conspirators Eve uses such strategy. Third they use the entanglement state and such strategy.
No conspirator in intercept/resend strategy We assume that Eve uses the intercept/resend strategy i.e. Eve intercepts l particles travelling from group A to group B, performs a measurement on her intercepted particles, and resends a l-particle fake state which is chosen according to the measurement result, in order to decrease discrepancies occurred from Eve's eavesdropping.
If Eve resends an arbitrary l-particle fake state regardless of the result of measurement, two groups will get a discrepancy in test bits with probability 1 2 , because states of two groups have no connection. However, if she resends depending on the measurement result, two groups will get a discrepancy from the shared bit with probability 1 8 in the original protocol, and with probability 1 4 in the modified protocol, respectively. Because there is no discarded bits in the modified protocol, the probability of the modified protocol is a little different with the primary protocol. Thus Eve should perform a measurement on her intercepted particles and should resend the l-particle fake state in accordance with the measurement result, in order to have the minimal error rate in test bits. However, although she does it, two groups can find errors for sufficiently many test bits.
Using intercept/resend strategy: Eve and conspirators We consider that Eve adopts the intercept/resend strategy and cooperates with dishonest members in two groups during the key agreement. To pass through the eavesdropping detection stage, she and her conspirators might try to avoid causing discrepancies from the shared bits of two groups in Step 7. In order to do so, the conspirators has to change N A y , N B y , P A or P B . However, it is impossible all conspirators except collectors are change suitable P A and P B to have no errors in shared bits. It is from that all members except collectors can have no information on P A and P B before announcing their outcomes. For N We assume that using the intercept/resend strategy Eve performs eavesdropping with the probability λ, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1; when λ = 0, Eve is not eavesdropping at all. Let r a be the number of conspirators in A and r b the number of conspirators in B. The two groups randomly select t shard bits in order to estimate the error rate.
In the primary protocol, then, Eve's eavesdropping causes the minimal error rate in the following:
In case r a = 0 and r b ≥ 1, we have
The Equation (5) is due to Eve and conspirators having chance of changing N B y and P B to stop causing discrepancy in test bits by using her measurement result. In order to changing N B y and P B , they need a help of the collector and the last member in B. They have the chance with ratio r b −1 l for one shared bit i.e. the her conspirators in B play roles of both the collector and the last member for one shared bit with the ratio. We get Equation (5) .
Equation (5) means that for sufficiently many test bits eavesdropping is detected. Figure 2 shows that two groups can choose sufficiently many test bits according to l.
We note that if the last member was the collector in B, this ratio would be larger than r b −1 l . So in the primary protocol it is the reason for that the last member is different with the collector in B during one key agreement.
In case r a ≥ 1 and r b = 0, we have 1 − 7 8
because like above case it is possible that Eve and conspirators in A change N A y and P A using the source |S and Eve's measurement result. Because this equation is similar to Equation (5), we does not discuss of equation. For this case, also, the above is the reason that the last member in A have to be different with the collector. In case r a ≥ 1 and r b ≥ 1, we have 7 8
In this case, they are able to use two methods discussed in the above paragraphs. In addition, they are able to change N in Equation (7) is from that each conspirator can play the role of the collector or the last member.
For this case, Figures 3 and 4 show that two groups can choose sufficiently many test bits according to k and l, if the conspirators is less than half of each groups. We notice that the more the conspirators are, the more larger test bits two groups need. The error rate of Equation (7) In case r a = 0,
In case r a ≥ 1,
For all cases, we can conclude that eavesdropping can be detected for sufficiently many test bits in view of the above equations.
Eve and conspirators in intercept/resend strategy using an entangled state We assume that Eve intercepts l particles travelling from A to B during distribution of the particles, and we call this state 'the intercepted state'. She randomly chooses one n-particle cat state in S and resends l particles of this cat state to B. We refer to the remainder k-particle state as 'the remainder state'.
If Eve performs a measurement on the intercepted state (or the remainder state) before N A y or (N B y ) is announced, then she has no information on P A (or P B ) before announcement of its. So she should performs a measurement on the intercepted state and the remainder state, after N A y and N B y are announced. She obtains the value of P B after N B y is announced. As in the case of P B the value of P A is obtained, if Eve has the information on |S . In order to use these information, she needs the ability to change P A or P B . Thus she has to be in conspiracy with collectors in A or B. Also, in order to stop causing error, she must cooperate with a conspirator in A for information on |S . Without conspirators, the test may introduce errors with a probability 1 2 , since the states of two groups has no entanglement and no connection. Only if the collector in A or B are conspirators and there exists conspirators in A, Eve can let the two groups find no error using information on P A or P B . Hence, the minimal error rate is displayed in following. In case r a = 0,
From Equation (8) and Equation (9) eavesdropping is detected for sufficiently many test bits.
QKD between two groups with center's assistance
Now, the QKD is this section between two groups can proceed, only if the center helps the two groups. So the center can authenticate two groups to each other and make any two groups communicate. We let the center be called 'group C', which consists of m members. To use efficiently the cat state, the chairman is required in this QKD as the modified protocol in Section 3. Because the chairman needs the information on |S , one chosen member in C has to play the role of the chairman. This QKD protocol is as follows:
1. Group C randomly chooses an n-particle cat state in S, which is denoted by |S .
2. Each particle of the n-particle cat state |S is transmitted to each member of the three groups.
3. Each member in the three groups, except the chairman, randomly performs a measurement on one's own particle, either in x-or y-direction. When each member has the eigenvalue +1 as measured outcome, he produces a outcome 0. Otherwise, he produces a outcome 1. 5. Three groups, A, B and C, collect the outcome to obtain P A , P B and P C , respectively, as in the previous protocols. Then C reveals P C .
For convenience, we may assume that the chairman be the collector in C. As in the modified protocol it have not a important effect on security. However, the collectors in A and B must not play a role of the last member. This will be discussed in Section 4.1.2
Here, A and B have shared one bit. In order to obtain bit strings, the three groups should repeat the above steps as many times as necessary.
6. Group A and group B have a public discussion on a set of bits used for detection of an eavesdropping. For the test bits, A and B reveal P 7. Group C announces the chosen cat states |S . For a set of test bits, the three groups can independently make a test for an eavesdropper's presence.
If the three groups find an error here, it means that there are eavesdropping or dishonest members, so all shared keys have to be discarded, and they must go back to step one. Otherwise, they can go on to Step 1.
After process of information reconciliation and privacy amplification, A and B can obtain the (final) key.
Security of protocol
Now, we will analyze the security for some cases. Like the previous protocols, dishonest members who try to find the secret key by themselves have no effect on this protocol and then we do not consider this case. So we consider an eavesdropper and conspirators in all groups, who use the intercept/resend strategy.
No conspirator in intercept/resend strategies
Now, there are three kinds of intercept/resend strategies used by Eve, because this protocol is between the three groups. Firstly, Eve intercepts k particles and l particles travelling from C to A and to B, respectively, and measures on the k particles and the l particles. Then she resends a k-particle fake state to A and an l-particle fake state to B, in accordance with the measurement results. Here, the k-particle fake state is not entangled with the l-particle fake state. We say that N 4 . Otherwise, the groups find the discrepancies with the probability 1 2 . Hence, Eve is detected with probability 3 8 . Second, Eve intercepts l particles travelling to B, measures it, and resends an l-particle fake state in accordance with the her result. It is with the probability . This case is similar with Eve's intercepting k particles travelling to A. So we does not discuss it.
Finally, Eve intercepts k + l particles from C to A and B, performs a measurement and resends a (k + l)-particle fake state to A and B in accordance with the result of Eve. Hence the k-particle fake states of A is entangled with the l-particle fake state of B.
Because the k-particle state is entangled with the l-particle state, if
are compatible with Eve's basis then the groups find no discrepancy. If not so, the discrepancy is found with probability 1 2 . For sufficiently many test bits, errors are introduced in the test bits having no connection with the strategies.
The first strategy with Eve and conspirators
Assume Eve adopts the first intercept/resend strategy, i.e., Eve intercepts the k particles and the l particles during transmission of particles. They try to avoid causing the error in the shared bits. To do so, they have to change the values of N 
Using the result of Eve's measurement, Eve is able to change N l . However, she can do nothing except this trick since the information on |S is not obtained before its announcement. Thus we have Equation (10) .
In case r c ≥ 1, we have y and |S , and by using Eve's measurement result before announcement of P A . Thus with probability 1 2 they can prevent error from being caused. They can let the probability of finding error change from . Although this order is changed, the result will be similar, because it is the replacement of P A with P B .
The second strategy with Eve and conspirators
We consider that Eve uses the second intercept/resend strategy and cooperate with dishonest members, i.e., she intercepts l particles. In this case Eve's eavesdropping causes the minimal error rate as follows. In case r c = 0, we have
Unlike the first strategy, they are not able to use the method of changing N A y , N B y , P A and P B at the same time, because the state of C is entangled with the state of A and they have no information on |S . So they have nothing to do and then have Equation (11) .
In case r c ≥ 1, we have .
If Eve cooperates with the collector in B, then she and conspirators are able to change P B in accordance with N A y , N B y , P A , P C and |S . However, unlike the first strategy, they cannot use the method of changing the value of P A because of the entanglement of the states of C and A. Thus we have Equation (12) .
In here, although Eve intercepts k particles travelling to A, the result is similar with this case.
The third strategy with Eve and conspirators
We assume that Eve uses the third intercept/resend strategy and conspires with dishonest members i.e. she intercepts l + k particles. In this strategy, Eve's eavesdropping causes the minimal error rate as follow: In case r c = 0, we have .
Eve and conspirators are able to change P B in accordance with N A y , N B y , P A , P C and |S but are not able to change P A without information on P B in this case, since the states of A and B are entangled. So, we have Equation (13) .
The equation of error rate gives a conclusion that for sufficiently many test bits Eve or dishonest members are detected except when the rate of dishonest members in each group is exceptionally large.
Summary
In this paper, we propose the generalized QKD protocols between the two groups by means of cat states. Also, we introduced the QKD between the two groups which needs the approval of center.
The center or the chairman plays an important role in these protocols. However, we analyzed that they have no effect on the security of these QKD and the dishonest members and eavesdropper can be detected. The importance of these protocols is that each member in the two groups, A and B, can't obtain the secret key strings without cooperating with other members, that is, the secret key strings can be obtained with all member's approval only.
